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THREE LESSONS FROM LAW AND
LITERATURE
Richard H. Weisberg*
It would be both redundant and erroneous to emphasize in this fo-
rum how important the literary disciplines have become for law over the
past fifteen to twenty years. Redundant, because the aversion to stories
that once characterized law schools and law professors has been replaced
by frequent literary critical forays in classrooms and law reviews; errone-
ous, because, despite the near boilerplate nature of the professoriat's
plundering of "postmodern theory," the literary sensibility in law has
been insufficiently recognized.
We need to recall that far less allied disciplines have been revolu-
tionized recently by an internally generated awareness of the narrative
nature of what once seemed "scientific" enterprises. Anthropology has
been destabilized and sociology eviscerated in large part because key
players in those fields have perceived that the story you tell is all there
really is. Psychology may well follow suit.
Nor have the sciences been immune from humanistic influence. We
all know that Charles Darwin's accounts, like Leonardo da Vinci's draw-
ings, combined the flash of insight of the artist with the "hard" realities
of the natural or physical worlds. In our time DNA has emerged as a
kind of hermeneutic code in the same way that Galileo Galilei's discover-
ies required first a complete shift in humankind's self-regarding mytholo-
gies. Medical students receive more classroom instruction in the
complexities of human nature than do law students; novels and short
stories often convey to them the sense of the whole person lacking in
their "rigorous" courses, but undeniably essential to their careers as
healers.
But law, proud law, dressed in a little brief authority,1 stubbornly
resists full recognition of its basically narrative nature. In some ways
even law and literature techniques have missed the point. Much of the
field's writing has been about "theory," and the debate has centered on
time-honored and perennial questions of who or what controls textual
* Walter Floersheimer Professor of Constitutional Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of
Law, Yeshiva University.
1. I paraphrase Isabella in Measure for Measure. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MEA-
SURE FOR MEASURE act 2, sc. 2 ("but man, proud man, Drest in a little brief authority").
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
meaning. Although one of my lessons here relates to the absence of
"plain meaning" in texts, in general the humanities have supplied more
heat than light to lawyers who have adequately understood these things
before Jacques Derrida or Martin Heidegger came on the scene. Sadly,
the one thinker who most brilliantly inquired into the nexus of meaning,
justice, and law continues to be badly misunderstood, and the same Der-
rida is somewhat to blame.2 Friedrich Nietzsche is cited endlessly as a
textual nihilist and disbeliever in justice. Eventually, our approach to
him may restore a sense both of his meanings-and he believed in autho-
rial meaning-and of the transcendence of certain texts that teach us
about the just existence.' This will take time.
Meanwhile, Richard Posner wrote a long book, full of rich detail,
the upshot of which is that the literary skills-except for stylistics, which
he sees as quite relevant to lawyers-are not that important for the law.'
As many have observed, we see his smiling face beaming out from the
jacket cover of that "law and literature" book, contrasted with his macho
grimace from the economics books that went before.5 Stories, his visage
tells us, are fun, and they may have their incidental place in understand-
ing some legal problems. But "science" is closer to law, and certainly
more serious. Let us not tamper with the economic tools that make us
wealthy. Let us not be paid what literature professors are paid.
While much of the ensuing skepticism about his venture is war-
ranted, Judge Posner's foray into law and literature inspires me because
it indicates his understanding that the fairly rudimentary approach econ-
omists take to language is inappropriate to law. People engaged in com-
plex transactions-and surely their lawyers-just do not use language in
the transparent and simplistic manner that economic analysis often pred-
icates. This Essay stresses the multidimensionality of language; it also
emphasizes what Judge Posner has, of course, failed to grasp: Law and
legal language are always bound up in ethical choices, a richness in our
2. Derrida provides drastic misreadings of Friedrich Nietzsche, internally justified by
Derrida's distorting theory of reading, one that would surely have dismayed Nietzsche, always
a careful exegete of others' writings. See JACQUES DERRIDA, SPURS: NIETZSCHE'S STYLES
105 (Barbara Harlow trans., Univ. of Chi. Press ed. 1979); see also Richard H. Weisberg, De
Man Missing Nietzsche: "'Hinzugedichtet" Revisited, in NIETZSCHE AS POSTMODERNIST 111,
111-24 (Clayton Koelb ed., 1990).
3. See Richard H. Weisberg, Text Into Theory: A Literary Approach to the Constitution,
20 GA. L. REV. 939, 962-76 (1986).
4. See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION
(1988).
5. Compare RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986); RICH-
ARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981) with POSNER, supra note 4.
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field that his own brand of economics-if surely not his own intelli-
gence-leaves untapped or absurdly allows to lie fallow.
The next step for law and literature proponents, faced with the iner-
tia or hostility associated with so-called harder approaches-although as
I have said, decay from within, as much as stress from without, can un-
dermine the staunchest edifice-is to infuse literary sensitivity into the
curriculum. Most law professors drop a bit of economic theory into their
classroom approach. Why should they not also employ at least a dollop
of literary technique? The following three "lessons" hope to inspire read-
ers to make this move, and are therefore not designed solely for use in a
class or seminar explicitly devoted to law and literature. All three draw
somewhat on earlier writings, but the emphases will give even a first time
reader a sense of the scope and ambition of the interdiscipline.
In what follows I resist a radical program of curricular reform. It
would be too easy, but at present also too contentious, to prove that a full
year of storytelling- courses in spoken and written communication,
rhetoric, and style-followed by a full year of listening-courses in her-
meneutics, sensitizing to "the other," and ethics-followed by a third
year of applying these skills to specific legal subjects might better prepare
the budding lawyer for practice than does our century-old Langdellian
system. The imaginative readers of this Symposium can-and this marks
the enduring "relevance" of what even an explorer named Christopher
Columbus has contributed to our politically correct and changing
planet-find ways to infuse what interests them into the already available
law school curriculum; for each lesson deals with the most essential skills
in our profession: the lawyer's capacity to hear others and to speak in
ways that will combine a sensitivity to audience with the aim of doing the
right thing.
I. LESSON NUMBER ONE: THINK ABOUT "CONSIDERATE
COMMUNICATION" WHENEVER YOU NEED TO INFLUENCE
YOUR LISTENER
The debate about Herman Melville's Billy Budd Sailor6 has just
about outlived its welcome. But I am encouraged to note that a recent
article by Elizabeth Fajans and Mary R. Falk7 asked, even at this late
date, for greater attention to one underplayed aspect of the debate.'
6. HERMAN MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD SAILOR (Harrison Hayford & Merton M. Sealts,
Jr. eds., University of Chicago Press 1962) (1924).
7. Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Against the Tyranny of Paraphrase: Talking Back to
Texts, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 163 (1993).
8. Id. at 197 n.150.
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When I first proposed the then eccentric notion that a story by a late
nineteenth-century American novelist might have great relevance to late
twentieth-century American law,9 I emphasized the concept of "consid-
erate communication" as the primary mode by which people in author-
ity-including lawyers and judges-address interested audiences.
Despite this focus, little of the ensuing vigorous debate about other asser-
tions I made has touched on that central theory of communication. This
first lesson means to demonstrate anew the vitality of considerate com-
munication for current law.
Readers of Billy Budd Sailor will recall that Herman Melville takes
time, early in the story, to recount the mutinous atmosphere that at-
tended the period of the tale. Regarding "the Great Mutiny" in particu-
lar, Melville's narrator offers the following seminal account of the
manner in which central information is conveyed to the public:
Such an episode in the Island's grand naval story her naval
historians naturally abridge, one of them (William James) can-
didly acknowledging that fain would he pass it over did not
"impartiality forbid fastidiousness." And yet his mention is
less a narration than a reference, having to do hardly at all with
details. Nor are these readily to be found in the libraries. Like
some other events in every age befalling states everywhere, in-
cluding America, the Great Mutiny was of such character that
national pride along with views of policy would fain shade it off
into the historical background. Such events cannot be ignored,
but there is a considerate way of historically treating them. If a
well- constituted individual refrains from blazoning aught amiss
or calamitous in his family, a nation in the like circumstance
may without reproach be equally discreet.10
This paragraph is central to an understanding of the story because,
as I have argued, the narration itself is imbued with "considerate com-
munication," and the most lawyer-like of Melville's characters, Captain
Vere, employs the device throughout the trial of Billy Budd for the kill-
ing of John Claggart. But I also pointed out that, as a theory of commu-
nication, the text superbly and even uniquely grasps modem
sophisticated techniques of information control. All lawyers must under-
stand these techniques to be successful, for they are used by most author-
9. Richard H. Weisberg, How Judges Speak. Some Lessons on Adjudication in "Billy
Budd Sailor," with an Application to Justice Rehnquist, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 34-58 (1982).
This analysis was expanded upon several years later in RICHARD H. WEISBERG, THE FAILURE
OF THE WORD: THE PROTAGONIST As LAWYER IN MODERN FICTION (1984).
10. MELVILLE, supra note 6, at 55.
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itative law-speakers. In addition, the individual lawyer may decide to
employ the technique on behalf of clients and causes to which he or she is
professionally committed.
What then is "considerate communication"? First, the passage
makes clear that it is a mode of transfer of data from people with greater
amounts of vital information-call them "authorities"-to people with
less-call them "the audience." Even in the kinds of representative de-
mocracies with which we are all familiar, authorities think carefully
about the amount and the kind of data they provide to the audience.
"Without reproach," we may usually condone their abstemiousness.
They have their jobs to do, for which a maximum of data is always ad-
vantageous; their audience has its job to do for which such data would
often be not only extraneous but occasionally upsetting.
Hence the phrase "considerate communication." The authorities'
decision to sharply limit their communications about, say, the Great Mu-
tiny-or think of recent American analogues such as the assassination of
President John F. Kennedy, or the Gulf War-is considerate both to
their own interests and to those of the audience. The authorities see no
good reason "to blazon aught amiss" when such verbal excessiveness
would have no beneficial effect on the problem and only a negative effect
on the audience. Let John Bull, or Middle America, enjoy their dinners
in peace; let the authorities do what they are best at: resolving difficult
matters of internal or foreign policy.
Then why not, as in many dictatorships, conceal the truth entirely?
Why not utter lies? Here, as the passage reminds us, "impartiality" may
"forbid" complete silence." Authorities in democratic cultures may oc-
casionally lie, but in general they and their various institutional spokes-
persons-press secretaries, the "respectable" media itself, and the like-
wish -to inform the public with at least some faithfulness to the data.
Indeed, reelection would become difficult if a large gap emerged between
official action and the facts authorities reveal. Watergate provides an ex-
ample of an even more drastic resolution.
"And yet his mention is less a narration than a reference, having to
do hardly at all with details."' 2 It is unnecessary to play the despot and
to indulge in the great lie. Selective information can be conveyed, truth-
ful as far as it goes. This control furthers the considerate quality of the
phenomenon: Authorities give away something to their constituents, and
the latter feel good about being let in. The audience can pursue its af-
11. See id.
12. Id.
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fairs, content that it is not being disregarded by its elected, or otherwise
constituted, leaders.
Furthermore, some events are so crucial to the audience that either
complete silence or falsehood would be calamitous to the authorities.
Unless there is an "official reference"-we would call it spin control to-
day-intelligent members of democratic communities tend to make their
own inquiries. Alerted to something as threatening as the Great Mu-
tiny-for such events always make themselves known somehow-but ex-
cluded entirely from the story, these industrious people both fact find and
produce independent interpretations of the event. The authorities, will-
ing to see such activity take place by small and noninfluential groups, do
not wish to see it occurring in any central way.
Why not, as in the immediate aftermath of the JFK assassination,
evoke a "reference," render it authoritative, and then let the organs of
respectable information-The New York Times, CBS News-do most of
the job of furthering the adopted position? Of course, there will be
counterflow fact finders and interpreters, but these will be treated as ex-
ogenous or even eccentric. How many opponents of the "one assassin
theory" were dismissed for decades as lunatics? Everybody, even in a
democracy, has a vested interest in selective information control and the
interpretive comfort to the majority that flows from it.
The necessity for and the tolerance of considerate communication are
directly proportionate to the contentiousness of the subject matter of the
utterance. Most transfers of information-say, about the weather, or the
cost of a gallon of gas, or even the closing price of a stock on a given
securities market-are intrinsically "considerate" if in fact given without
any special thought. But Melville's narration indicates that, when it
comes to controversial matters, people are moved less by unreflected
statements of "truth" than by speech acts that are designed to placate
some of the beliefs they already hold dear.
Lawyers are neither immune from nor incapable of using consider-
ate communication. Yet few have any formal training in this subject. A
baleful outgrowth of law and economics, to which I have already alluded,
is indeed the misplaced impression it may give that language is transpar-
ent or unidimensional. Considerate communication is far more realistic,
tracking as it does the multilayered nature of words, particularly words
used by authorities to address various interested audiences.
When, for example, an appellate court has before it a matter likely
to bring on a unanimous decision, considerate communication may be
less necessary than when the court is sharply divided. Judge Cardozo's
use of the empathetic phrase "a lad of 16" in the first sentence of his
[Vol. 27:285
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controversial decision in Hynes v. New York Central Railroad,13 or Chief
Justice Rehnquist's use of an off-putting word like "transmuted" to de-
scribe the claim made unsuccessfully in Paul v. Davis, 4 denote the tricky
situations in which judges-as much as other authorities-will use con-
siderate communication. The "facts" sections of appellate opinions tend
to be recounted selectively, in the manner of William James telling the
British people about the Great Mutiny.
Similarly, when a practicing lawyer has a theory likely to ruffle some
feathers, he or she will need to assess the manner in which that theory
should be conveyed. The same is true for law professors, as anyone with
a nonstandard interpretation of a sacred text can verify. When an indi-
vidual is fighting for a deeply felt but unpopular cause, considerate com-
munication will enhance the probability of success. Indeed, the technique
is probably a prerequisite for achieving the desired result.
Audiences to disturbing or ground-breaking remarks, in fact, de-
serve considerateness, and an authority who spits out information and
advice without caring for the audience's already situated beliefs is usually
not heard and is always in a sense irresponsible. The remarkable dispar-
ity in effectiveness between Henry Kissinger, probably our most gifted
political communicator, and Jimmy Carter, a fine but inept man, may
provoke the understanding that simply having the right instincts hardly
brings about the right results, even when you are nominally "in charge."
When the dull Iran-gate lawyers squared off against the colorful military
rhetoricians, there was a similarly counterintuitive result."5 My third les-
son returns in part to this observation about the way leaders
communicate.
Words are tricky. Lawyers must deal with them every day. An
ounce of considerate communication is worth a pound of
microeconomics.
II. LESSON NUMBER Two: BEFORE You Go OVERBOARD AND
MAKE ALL YOUR SPEECH "CONSIDERATE," RECALL THE
EXAMPLE OF "LAWTALK" IN VICHY, FRANCE
Herman Melville indicated that considerate communication is mor-
ally neutral or even pragmatically praiseworthy. "If a well-constituted
individual in like circumstances," he has told us, "refrains from blazon-
13. 131 N.E. 898, 898 (N.Y. 1921); see RICHARD H. WEISBERG, POETHICS AND OTHER
STRATEGIES OF LAW AND LITERATURE 17-20 (1992).
14. 424 U.S. 693, 698 (1976); see Weisberg, supra note 9, at 43-58.
15. See WEISBERG, supra note 13, at 218.
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ing aught amiss,"1 6 then surely we, too, should see the difference between
total "honesty" and interpersonal effectiveness. But what if we find our-
selves in the midst of circumstances that touch our deepest beliefs, and
yet we are asked to speak as evenhanded lawyers about those circum-
stances? Are we to remain "considerate" when selective and courteous
communication risks furthering a moral wrong? Shorn of the Nore his-
torians' desire to inform without panicking, 7 and of Judge Cardozo's
desire to do justice without distorting legal principles, should we practice
considerate communication in the service of a corrupt end?
My second lesson is meant to answer this question resoundingly in
the negative. Considerate communication exists either as a benign tool of
understanding the way others are likely to react, or as an aid to the law-
yer to do what he or she thinks is right. When Melville proceeded, in the
full context of Billy Budd Sailor, to show that we must always be on
guard to detect the underlying values of the communicator, he was also
advising us to challenge and to improve our own ways of behaving so
that considerate communication never deteriorates, as it does in Claggart
and Captain Vere, to morally indefensible forms of covert or false speech.
To exemplify the distinction between Judge Cardozo and Captain
Vere, I hop one more body of water and land in the world of Vichy law-
to that period between 1940 and 1944 that the French have managed to
cloak in secrecy, or in the myth of "universal resistance," until recent
events have shown their considerate formulations to be lies.
In the part of France left autonomous by the conquering Germans
in 1940, the French established a regime that quickly enacted, indepen-
dently from German influence, a scheme of racial definition that in many
ways exceeded the Nuremburg models. 8 Faced with the new legislation,
hundreds of lawyers, magistrates, administrative judges, and bureaucrats
were asked to implement, interpret, and rationalize the laws.' 9 They saw
before them texts that singled out groups, particularly Jews, for special
persecution. 20 A mere few weeks before, these same lawyers would have
dismissed such texts as violative of every principle of French constitu-
tional law to which their training had exposed them. Now they saw
before them the weird texts of racial exclusion, random imprisonment,
career curtailment, loss of property, and by imaginative extension, ex-
pungement of life itself.
16. MELVILLE, supra note 6, at 55.
17. See Weisberg, supra note 9, at 35-36.
18. See WEISBERG, supra note 13, at 144.
19. See id. at 146-47.
20. See id. at 147.
[Vol. 27:285
LESSONS FROM LAW AND LITERATURE
Yet the constitutional premises of equal protection still existed in
Vichy. Some lawyers in some contexts utilized the old verities and even
protested against nonracial violations by the government. As we shall
see, there were even isolated objections at the beginning to the anti-Se-
mitic legislation, but there was no enduring or organized protest by any
lawyer or legal group against those racial laws. For four long years the
French legal community-again largely without German pressure-built
its own system of increasingly complex racial definition and restriction.21
There was little inclination to question the need for, or the appropri-
ateness under French legal traditions of, ostracizing Jews on the basis of
race. As Frangois Dominique-Gros very recently reported, the number
of outright protests-he has studied the writings of law professors in par-
ticular-did not increase substantially even as the war wound to a close
and allied victory appeared inevitable.
2 The Vichy-authored statutes,2 3
which became so appealing to the Germans that they extended them to
the Occupied Zone as well-were assimilated "considerately" into the
French system.
One of the very few notable legal protests lodged on a high level of
generalization was that of Professor Jacques Maury of the Toulouse Law
School. Professor Maury, in the authoritative Journal Officiel covering
the period just after promulgation of the Vichy denaturalization and ra-
cial laws of 1940, stated that making exceptions of individuals, purely on
the basis of immutable traits,
has been substituted for or (better) juxtaposed with a more
gradual approach to necessary changes. The French people
find themselves placed in three categories of non-identical stat-
ure. There is an increasing abandonment of our long-held rule
21. See id. at 150-51.
22. Frangois Dominique-Gros, Le "Statut des Juifs" et les Manuels en Usage Dans les
Facult.s de Droit, 1940-44, at 7 (1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Loyola of Los
Angeles Law Review). Of 39 legal manuals studied, Professor Dominique-Gros cites only two
that fall into his category of expressing "clear hostility" to the racial laws. Id. at 8. Another
handful contains "commentaire assorti de r6serves" [selected expressions of doubt]. Id.
23. French internal documents made no pretense about the origins of the racial laws under
which most Jews, in both zones(!), were persecuted: These laws were of Vichy derivation.
Typically, the tragic case of a Paris court of appeals Judge Laemle involved a set of Vichy
documents tracing his fate, all citing the French law of October 3, 1940, and no German
ordinance, under the terms of which on December 17, 1940 he was "mis d la retraite" [fired].
Judge Laemle was eventually arrested and deported just for being Jewish under the French
legal definitions. See Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine Doe. VI-140, at 1 (origi-
nally dated Apr. 12, 1942).
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guaranteeing equality in their rights as well as in their responsi-
bilities to all French people.24
Although Professor Maury did not specifically attack the newly
promulgated Vichy racial law of October 3, 1940, his lengthy state-
ment-elaborated over several articles-in one of the profession's most
prominent publications surely stood as a challenge to the already tangible
legislative policies dividing citizen from citizen-and citizen from
"noncitizen"-on the basis of race. As was true of every such strong
protest against Vichy law's violation of foundational French constitu-
tional beliefs, Professor Maury's writings did not result in any punish-
ment to the speaker, either by the French government or the Germans.
No lawyer was ever sanctioned professionally, much less imprisoned or
worse, for publishing such jugular attacks against the regime's laws. So,
why, especially when it came to attacking Vichy's racism, as opposed to
its other violations of French constitutional tradition, were there so few
Professor Maurys?
The response to the legislation reveals a pervasive acceptance of the
new racial scheme, less because of anti-Semitism than because lawyers
are generally disinclined to challenge systems at their very heart. In-
stead, Vichy lawyers delighted in attacking lower level problems. For
example, does an individual with two Jewish and two non-Jewish grand-
parents count as a Jew? The statute was ambiguous on this point and
there were hundreds of cases disputing Jewish status in this way.2" The
question was endlessly debated. Too few chose to ask Professor Maury's
question, even though it was as much a "legal" question as the ones that
were asked: "Are these 'laws' legitimate?"
Indeed, the progression in Professor Maury's discourse over the
next few years indicates that internal professional pressures led even a
right-minded analyst such as himself to adapt to an apologetic way of
speaking about racial definition. 26 The progression in legal discourse to-
wards an interpretive "mainstream" that abided and utilized the racial
24. JOURNAL OFEICIEL DE LA RtPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE, doc. 169 (Oct. 18, 1940) (trans-
lated from French by Author).
25. See Richard H. Weisberg, Legal Rhetoric Under Stress: The Example of Vichy, 12
CARDOZO L. REv. 1371 (1991).
26. An original protest does not suffice, although if rendered by the profession's leaders, it
will set an impressive and perhaps definitive tone. The essential, however, is to trace the pro-
gression of discourse from an original protest to a more, or less, acceptable position. This is
how professional discourse develops in precisely the kind of free-flowing environment that I
claim was that of French law from 1940 to 1944. Professor Maury was quite outspoken at
first. Let us see how his discourse softened over time.
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laws can be preliminarily revealed by watching Professor Maury's subtle
shift.
When, just three months before D-Day, Professor Maury was asked
to opine about the Jewishness of three young children of a mixed mar-
riage in Toulouse, he had come far from his stance of jugular protest
against the first fruits of Vichy legislation. Too much had happened dur-
ing the almost four years since the regime launched its program. There
was no longer any doubt of the racial laws' "Frenchness," no longer any
talk of the unacceptability of distinguishing one person from another on
the basis of immutable characteristics. The discourse had softened;
"lawtalk" had accommodated. And the issues had sorted themselves out
on a far lower level of generalization. French law, without much prod-
ding from the Germans-except in the form of Nazi slaps on overzealous
Vichy wrists-had gradually come into existence by just this process of
rhetorical give and take, of -professional discourse, of learning what is
right and wrong by lawyers watching and heeding what other lawyers
were saying and doing-and not through "basic ethics" or even "estab-
lished French constitutional principles."28 For the Jacques Maury of
March, 1944, there persisted none of the original-one might say "foun-
dational"--objections:
The undersigned professor, Jacques Maury, professor of
comparative law on the faculty of the University of Toulouse,
offering on that faculty the course in private international law,
director of the Institute of Comparative Law at the University,
offer the following opinion on the racial quality [le caractrre
racial] of the Levy children.
27. I have looked at this rhetorical phenomenon with regard to Joseph Haennig's learned
article entitled What Means of Proof Can the Jew of Mixed Blood Offer to Establish His Nonaf-
filiation with the Jewish Race?, which was published in the 1943 authoritative French reporter,
the Gazette du Palais. See WEISBERG, supra note 25, at 1371-76 & apps. 1-10; Richard H.
Weisberg, Cartesian Lawyers and the Unspeakable: The Case of Vichy France, TIKKUN, Sept.-
Oct. 1992, at 46; David Margolick, At the Bar: The Action of a Lawyer in Occupied France
Raises the Question: Is Nit-Picking Collaboration?, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1991, at B18.
28. For a masterful analysis of how professional discourse develops and changes, see
STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE COM-
MUNITIES 338-71 (1980). For Professor Fish, a professional discourse is never subject to over-
riding "rules" because only the way people talk and behave in a given community can establish
what the "rules" of the group are at any given time. See id. at 342-43; see also Dani~le
Lochak, La Doctrine sous Vichy, ou les Mesaventures du Positivisme, in LE STATUT DES JUIFS
DE VICHY 121, 124 (Serge Klarsfield ed., 1990) (speaking of "banalisation" of racial laws
partly in terms of academic lawyers' "measured, neutral, and detached tone"). Professor
Lochak, to the best of my knowledge, does not cite Professor Maury's writings and concludes
that no law professor raised a voice in protest, but this is an overstatement. See id. at 125.
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The following facts have been given to us: three children
have been born of the marriage, celebrated on 23 November
1936 in Toulouse between Mr. LEVY, an Argentinian national
of the Jewish race, and Miss MAGNE Simone, aryan and
French by nationality, remaining French despite this marriage;
the three are Gilbert, born 24 October, 1934... Serge, born 15
November, 1935 ... Michelle, born 28 January, 1940 ....
These children were baptized; Gilbert on 15 August 1935,
Serge on 15 May 1941, and Michelle on 18 June 1940. Their
birth and baptismal certificates have been presented.
On this state of the facts, we have been asked to opine on
the race of the LEVY children.29
Professor Maury then cited the prevalent statute of June 2, 1941,
which tracked the October 3rd law's ambiguous treatment of people with
two Jewish and two non-Jewish grandparents, the case here, but added
that such people would be considered Jewish if they "belonged to the
Jewish race on 25 June 1940. ",30 Are the Levy children to be considered
Jewish under these facts and under this law?
STOP RIGHT NOW! Aren't you tempted to sink your teeth into
this question, forgetting the hideous framework in which it arises? You
are a lawyer, after all! You are paid to sort out the differences among
these seemingly similarly situated children. And you are not responsible
for the law itself, are you? Maybe you can help little Serge, whose bap-
tism came almost eleven full months too late to satisfy the legal cutoff
date of June 25, 1940. Maybe you can use considerate communication to
help in this one case while not offending your audience by attacking the
law as a whole-say by noting its ex post facto nature, its placing the
burden on the child, or its inherent unconstitutionality and un-French-
ness. So Professor Maury crafts a response:
The negative answer is clearly applicable to Gilbert, and to
Michelle, both baptized before that date according to the Cath-
olic rite.... Although some courts of first jurisdiction at the
outset of the application of the law of [2 June] 1941 held that
what was needed was a "real" commitment to Catholicism or
Protestantism and that such a commitment could not be found
29. Jacques Maury, Consultation sur l'aryanitd des enfants LEVY, Centre de Documenta-
tion Juive Contemporaine Doc. XVIIa-44, at 1 (originally dated Mar. 6, 1944) (translated
from French by Author) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review) [hereinafter Opinion
of Maury].
30. Id.
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in a child of tender yearsE31 ... the law has moved, apparently
with good sense, to the opposite conclusion. Today the point is
settled that baptism suffices to prove the nonaffiliation with the
Jewish race ["la nonappartenance a la religion juive"], the deci-
sion of the Conseil d'Etat of 7 January 1944... [preserving the
job of a mixed-heritage functionary who produced a baptismal
certificate from the reformed church]. Against such proof, no
contrary presumption can prevail....
The issue is different, both factually and legally, when it
comes to Serge, baptized on 15 May 1941.
The law once held that only belonging to one of the reli-
gions recognized by the state before the law of 9 December
1905 could prove nonaffiliation to the Jewish religion, which
would lead to declaring as Jewish all those with two grandpar-
ents of the Jewish race who could not demonstrate that they
were Catholics or Protestants before 25 June 1940. But this
approach has been justly criticized by almost all the commenta-
tors, and has also been rejected by both ordinary and adminis-
trative courts. Although the Cour de Cassation [France's
highest civil court] has not to our knowledge ruled on the
point, many courts including Appeals Courts have ruled that
nonaffiliation with the Jewish religion can be proved by all
other means [besides baptism alone]. This is incidentally the
solution reached by German courts, whether on the basis of the
occupation ordinances of 1940, 1941 or 1942 or the [indigenous
German] law of 15 September 1935.32
Professor Maury then turned considerately to the difficult issue of
Serge's adherence or nonadherence to Judaism, given the ambiguous tim-
ing and nature of the boy's religious acts. He first adopted a controver-
sial stance:
31. The cases on baptism, including the curiosity cited here by Professor Maury, were
legion. German law considered baptismal records to be dispositive of non-Jewishness in the
case of a mixed-heritage individual-even an infant, who perhaps did not have what the early
Vichy courts wanted: a "full awareness of his religious choice." This language comes from a
case that represented the predominant view in Vichy at the time, Charles Robert Lang, decided
by a Brive tribunal that fined Lang for not registering as Jews his two infant children, both of
whom had been baptized and had only two Jewish grandparents. See Semaine Jurdique (Juris-
Classeur P6riodique), July 12, 1942. Its reasoning was challenged vigorously by other courts;
hence Maury's statement. The Nazis occasionally urged their Vichy confreres to declare non-
Jewish a mixed-heritage individual who could produce such a baptismal certificate. See WEIS-
BERG, supra note 13, at 274 n.24. The case law indicates that the French often declined to do
so, thus implicating a broader scope of individuals than under Nazi law. See id.
32. Opinion of Maury, supra note 29, at 1-2 (citations omitted).
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Now in fact Serge LEVY has never belonged to the Jewish
religion, and all the indications presented to us constitute, in
this regard, sufficient factual presumptions. It would be inex-
plicable, by the way, to find one child out of three, or one son
out of two raised in the Jewish religion while the other son, or
the two other children, would be raised as Catholics. Such an
arrangement would be completely untypical of the approach of
spouses of differing religions. 3
But here Professor Maury knew that his legal logic in 1944 con-
trasted with that of official Vichy, which held that different family mem-
bers might well be treated differently by the racial laws.34 Rather than
challenge the prevalent orthodoxy, the professor extended his argument
on the absurdity of finding Serge Jewish but his siblings Aryan by
stressing the indifference of father Levy to his Judaism compared to the
familial concern about Catholic ritual:
It has been shown that Mr. LEVY, completely detached
from the Jewish religion, did not participate at all in it....
[Serge's] baptism in 1941 might be suspect if it stood alone. It
is in a way authenticated by the baptisms of his brother and
sister, which show by their very existence that the family reli-
gion was Catholicism, although by the tardiness [of the bap-
tisms] that perhaps the rites of that religion were not strictly
adhered to. The actual practice of the Catholic religion by the
two older children, their keeping to the catechism, confirms as
well the reality of their religious life, which their parents surely
chose for them. There was certainly no [formal] adherence by
Serge to Catholicism before 25 June 1940. From the facts, as
they have been reported, we can deduce that Serge LEVY did not
belong to the Jewish religion, and therefore he is not Jewish
under the law of 2 June, 1941.
35
Professor Maury concluded by harmonizing his findings with Ger-
man law, adding that: "In the Occupied Zone, unless there is a new
ordinance that has not yet come to our knowledge, the LEVY children
33. Id. at 2.
34. On April 11, 1941, for example, an internal Vichy memorandum noted a lawyer's
wonderment that the regime's racial laws "will lead to different treatments under law of two
brothers with identical father and mother ... [,]" to which his superior responded in the
memo's margins: "Yes!"--indicating the agency's firm view that different treatment is occa-
sionally mandated. Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine Doc. CXIV-9a (originally
dated Apr. 11, 1944) (translated from French by Author) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles
Law Review).
35. Opinion of Maury, supra note 29, at 3.
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would not be Jewish. There is not the slightest reason to consider them
such in the southern zone, since according to existing French law they
are aryans.
' 36
STOP AGAINI Are you pleased with the professor? Did he not do
some good in an awful situation? His words were polite, his appeal to the
audience considered and proper, and the outcome he urged may save the
boy. If he had directly attacked the statute, as he did in 1940, he could
not have done this much. And, after all, no one listened in 1940. Of
course the statute and the cases are grotesque. And it is true that the
next child whose "Jewishness" is asserted may lose his life using the very
logic against him that the professor created in favor of little Serge. What
would we have Maury do?37
Jugular protest, although rare, did attend the promulgation of the
October 3, 1940 racial statute. Foundational attacks on Vichy legislation
were published and abided, and they would continue, in very small doses,
throughout the four years of the regime. The political trials at Riom,
launched by the regime against such III Republic leaders as Edouard
Daladier and Leon Blum, inspired some prominent lawyers to pick up on
Professor Maury's 1940 theme of the "un-Frenchness" of the regime's
laws, although the Riom protest unfortunately did not specifically ad-
dress the racial laws per se. But Professor Maury's own rhetorical shift,
over the years, to a neutral tone accepting the racial premise as a given-
where he once saw it as grotesque and aberrational-is typical of French
professional discourse during the period. It is not so much that some
protested, continued to protest, and then gave up or were somehow si-
lenced; rather, the racial laws became a viable reality because the dis-
course of direct protest never caught on. As soon as several key lawyers
accepted, authenticated, and in fact created the racial texts3" by adapting
them to their practice, the whole profession fell into line. The choice, as
36. Id. at 4.
37. My last sentence paraphrases Posner's rejoinder to me about Joseph Haennig. See
POSNER, supra note 4, at 173 ("What would Weisberg have had Haennig do?").
38. Texts, legal or otherwise, have no implementable meaning apart from what those who
use and control them decide. If a lawyer says he is constrained by a statute to act in ways that
violate his ethics, he is interpreting the statute to bring about that violation. If enough lawyers
ignore a statute or rewrite it through interpretation, it can be rendered harmless. See FISH,
supra note 28, at 338-71. My differences with Professor Fish begin with Vichy. See WEIS-
BERG, supra note 13, at 172-75. But they also end there. If lawyers in Vichy had been believ-
ers in Professor Fish, they might have perceived that they were free to make of the racial laws
anything they wanted. In fact, that is what they "did" with the laws they are now fully re-
sponsible for. No written text forced them as a community to act the way they did. The
problem is that no written text constrained them to act otherwise, either. My answer to Pro-
fessor Fish is that we must work as a community to develop beliefs in texts that will induce us
to refuse ever again to repeat Vichy's errors. To do this, we must retain the theoretical belief
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the contrasting examples of Belgium, Denmark, and even Italy reveal,
was entirely the French community's.
Considerately moving in the gradual way that professional rhetoric
will, French lawyers and courts found racism tolerable. They easily
learned to accommodate those few colleagues whose nausea in the face of
what they were seeing placed them increasingly at the margins of polite
legal discourse. But only they were to blame for what became marginal
and what, sadly, became central.
The lesson for us involves the limits to considerate communication
within our own moral world. While we must always have our audience
in mind if we are to accomplish the aims that we value, we must never
emulate the Vichy lawyer's practice of surrendering our deeply held be-
liefs by the very process of rationalizing, and hence rendering acceptable,
everything we hate. Eventually, people will probe our speech and find
within it either the strength of an ethical system or the Vichy-like weak-
ness of professional accommodation to the bad.
III. LESSON NUMBER THREE: WHATEVER You DO SAY, Do NOT
THINK ITS MEANING IS "PLAIN"
Suppose a French lawyer in 1941, at the height of the Vichy re-
gime's power, decided to heed my second lesson and to publish an incon-
siderate jugular attack on French racial laws. What more would have
been accomplished than to make that lawyer feel better, or perhaps to
show future analysts of the period that there were some good, in both
senses, lawyers around at the time? Experience, coupled with Lesson
One, 9 teach us that small and ineffectual minorities will be tolerated as
long as they are self-limiting. But what if our hypothetical lawyer hoped
to move his colleagues to feel and to act according to principle? What if
the aim was nothing less than to change the behavior of the majority of
the legal profession, to get them to ignore or to reverse the racial laws?
How would that salutary aim be achieved? Forgoing considerate
communication, our ethical lawyer wants to speak directly to his audi-
ence about his absolute rejection of racism. Richard Posner, bullying my
first writings about Vichy, has already stated that such an attack "would
not have been published."'  Like much of what Judge Posner originally
that some texts, and they must be ones that we choose for their ethical excellence, do in fact
immutably require us to resist the persecution of others on racial grounds.
39. See supra part I.
40. POSNER, supra note 4, at 173.
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said about Vichy, this is simply wrong.4 1 In any case, "getting pub-
lished" is only half the battle; our lawyer wants to have his words at-
tended to as well. Many of the lawyers that I have interviewed in France
asserted that such words, spoken by a few leaders, would have effectively
avoided racial genocide in France-if spoken early.42 Will an audience
now set in its beliefs also listen?
What does an audience do with a speech act that strikes mercilessly,
"inconsiderately," at its own prejudices? To answer this, we must reckon
with two situations. The first, which we have already offered earlier, is
that the audience simply refuses to heed the communication. Like the
heretical minority's view of the WFK assassination, our lawyer's moral
attack on anti-Jewish laws will simply be ignored. He will be tolerated,
but treated like a pariah. Without considerate communication, a speech
act that tends to challenge its audience's deeply held beliefs will almost
definitely not be heeded.
The second situation, however, posits a lawyer already held in such
high esteem by the audience that his or her every utterance commands its
attention.43 If a professional leader decided to challenge the racial laws
centrally-and this simply did not happen in France, although it did
happen in Belgium, for example"--how would he or she be understood?
Put differently, what will an audience do when confronted with an
authoritative communication that must be heeded, but which is blatantly
offensive to the audience's deeply held beliefs? It might decide to change.
But, more likely, it will construe the message to mean something it can
tolerate. No matter how "plain" the authority believed its message to be,
the audience would find a way to read it painlessly.
Suppose, for example, that a law school dean reduced a commence-
ment message to these pithy phrases: "I never really wanted any of you
to go into practice, whatever I may have said. My prayer to you today is
to avoid taking the bar and to find something else to do with your lives."
41. See the example of Jacques Maury, supra note 24. There were dozens of other promi-
nently published protests against the regime's basic legal structure throughout the four years,
although again almost none relating to the racial laws per se.
42. See, for example, the words of Philippe Serre, a French lawyer and one of the few
members of the National Assembly in 1940 to refuse to grant full powers to the new Vichy
regime: "[Tihe Germans would not have insisted on a racial policy if the French had refused."
Richard H. Weisberg, France: From Vichy to Carpentras, WALL ST. J. (Int'l ed.), Oct. 12,
1990, at 8.
43. A subtle response to this hypothetical would be that no such person would take such a
position, having been weaned away from radically ethical postures by the very success that
defines him or her. I will put aside for another time an answer to this cynical but strong
counterfactual.
44. See WEISBERG, supra note 13, at 291 n.153.
November 1993]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
Now we cannot completely ignore the dean, even as we are about to leave
her jurisdiction. But what a message! It cannot be that the dean meant
that after three stressful years we graduating "three Ls" should leave the
law before actually entering into its mysteries. Aha! The dean meant
what she was always trying to tell us more politely while we were in law
school. We should become law professors! It is a much happier life. Oh,
that dean of ours. What a proselytizer for the academic life. She's
terrific!
Plain meanings can only be discovered by audiences receptive to
them. The word "chicken," as Walter Benn Michaels reminds us, pos-
sesses no inherent clarity once a judge decides that it can mean at least
two different things,4" just as the word "rocks" in the William Word-
sworth poem, A Slumber Did My Spirit Seal,46 can suggest either ecstatic
life or instant obliteration. Even the "plainest" word in our most author-
itative secular text, the United States Constitution, is always open to in-
terpretation. Anthony D'Amato has definitively indicated that such
seemingly "unambiguous" phrases as the thirty-five-year-old minimum
age requirement for presidents would be "compromised" if the appropri-
ate dispute arose.47
When audiences want to hear X, they will find it in Y. Until they
have been prepared for it, they will not find Y anywhere. "[Tlhe readi-
ness is all," as the fifth act of Hamlet reminds us. 48 But it was also he
who moved from the relativism of his act two---"[t]here is nothing either
good or bad, but thinking makes it so,"4 9--to the mature understanding
that we control our own fates and that we can act in the direction of
what is right.
If the top authority in the field cannot instantly convince his audi-
ence to change, how is that "right" to be accomplished? Perhaps it can
never be reached through language alone. But if language stands ready
to assist, despite its absence of plainness, it must be used with a combina-
tion of forthrightness and audience awareness of which we have few ex-
amples in times of crisis.
45. See Walter B. Michaels, Against Formalism: Chickens and Rocks, in INTERPRETING
LAW AND LITERATURE 215, 217-18 (Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux eds., 1988) (citing
Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)).
46. WILLIAM WORDSWORTH, A Slumber Did My Spirit Seal, in THE COMPLETE POETI-
CAL WORKS OF WORDSWORTH 113, 113 (Andrew J. George ed., 1932).
47. Anthony D'Amato, Aspects of Deconstruction: The "Easy Case" of the Under-Aged
President, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 250 (1989).
48. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 5, sc. 2.
49. Id act 2, sc. 2.
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The final lesson for us here is therefore more of a challenge: to re-
tain one's sense of the ethically correct as one moves ahead in the field; to
muster the beauty and the skill of considerate communication to make
one's values feasible within the community; to recognize and decipher
considerate communication when used by authoritative others; to decline
considerateness when it becomes an end in itself and betrays the deepest
part of oneself; but then to speak forthrightly while also finding a way to
convince colleagues to change their ways, if those ways have become
errant.
Fortunately, Americans have a tradition of such speech, which finds
the path both to inspire and to criticize. I will close with a passage from
Martin Luther King, Jr., in one of his least compromising and yet most
considerate modes, the Letter from Birmingham Jail.0 Imprisoned, Dr.
King found a way to appeal to eight white "moderate" clergymen who
had verbally attacked civil rights demonstrators in that crucial year of
1963. It is worth striving-ethically and linguistically-to emulate his
model:
Any law that uplifts human personality is just. Any law that
degrades human personality is unjust. All segregation statutes
are unjust because segregation distorts the soul and damages
the personality. It gives the segregator a false sense of superior-
ity and the segregated a false sense of inferiority. Segregation,
to use the terminology of the Jewish philosopher Martin Buber,
substitutes an "I-it" relationship for an "I-thou" relationship
and ends up relegating persons to the status of things. Hence
segregation is not only politically, economically and sociologi-
cally unsound, it is morally wrong and sinful."1
50. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., Letter from Birmingham Jail, in WHY WE CAN'T WAIT
77 (1963); see Susan Tiefenbrun, Semiotics and Martin Luther King's "Letter from Birming-
ham Jail," 4 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LITERATURE 255 (1992).
51. KING, JR., supra note 50, at 85.
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